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Abstract 
This paper models the dynamic of migration with a particular focus on the cumulative process that 
causes a variation in the distribution of income in sending communities and therefore a variation 
in the distribution of skills across different cohorts. The model provides a theoretical framework to 
Cumulative Causation theory of migration and specifically a theoretical rationale behind the use of 
migration prevalence ratio to study migration flows. Moreover the model shows how brain drain 
(in sending communities) and negative cohort effect in terms of education (in receiving 
communities) are the result of a positive selection of migrants in terms of skills if there is a 
intergenerational transmission of education.  
 
Keywords: Migration, Overlapping Generation, Networks, Selection 
 
                                                          
1
 Department of Economics (DSE), Alma Mater Studiorum – University of Bologna 
2
 CRAG (CSIC-UAB-IRTA-UB), Campus Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain 
2 
 
1 Introduction 
International migration is one of the most debated issues among scholars, policy makers 
and public opinion. Cumulative Causation theory as developed by Massey and followers is one of 
the most extensive and comprehensive theory of migration and it is largely accepted among 
scholars, however it lacks of a formal structure. This paper is aimed to fill this gap. We propose a 
possible formalization of Cumulative Causation based on an overlapping generation model as the 
one proposed in Loury (1981). Our approach provides a formal background to the use of Migration 
Prevalence ratios as proposed in Massey et al. (1994) and provides a possible interpretation to the 
selection of migrants phenomenon. 
As argued in Durand et al. (2001) migration prevalence (generally used to incorporate the 
community-level migration network) does not describe the migration flow per se, but rather, a 
phase in its development. It is a useful measure which can capture the level of development of 
migration flows in a community. 3 Each migrant, creating new links in the receiving country and 
retaining4 some in the sending country, modifies the social environment in both, allowing the 
accumulation of migration-specific knowledge (migration social capital) able to reduce the costs 
and risks of migration and generating a self-perpetuating mechanism. In particular, networks 
affect the relation between migration and wealth, mitigating the effect of budget constraints not 
only by reducing costs and risks, but also acting as substitutes for financial and insurance markets.5 
The endogenous process identified by network theory is not limited to potential migrants, 
since migration alters the whole sending country’s socio-economic environment as proposed in 
Cumulative Causation theory. The accumulation of migration-specific social capital, remittances, 
changes in the distribution of wealth6 and land, all concur in generating a new set-up which has 
the potential to produce favorable new conditions for migration. 
One of the most debated effect of this cumulative process is the “decline” in quality of 
migrants over time (Borjas, 1985). Literature on the selection of migrants is extensive, going back 
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 Migration prevalence ratios are calculated with information on the date of birth of household members and on the 
year of their first trip to the U.S. For a complete explanation on how to compute migration prevalence ratios, see 
Massey et al. (1994). 
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The main pro of their model is to take into account the effect of migration in local labor markets, making migration an 
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3 
 
to the 1978 pioneer work by Chiswick and Borjas’ 1985 reply. Several prominent scholars have 
contributed to the debate between positive and negative selection, producing theoretical and 
empirical evidence to support one or the other side. It is not uncommon to read articles which, 
using the same or very “similar” databases, reach opposite empirical results. Recently, McKenzie 
and Rapoport (2007) gave a partial explanation of this phenomenon stressing the effect of 
networks on the composition of migration flows. 
This paper proposes a theoretical framework, capable of explaining, under a few simple 
assumptions, this dynamic process and how positive selection and negative cohort effect are 
complementary in this cumulative process. In the model proposed, networks are not at the origin 
of the decline in the quality of migrants, but they can amplify this mechanism and the use of 
migration prevalence as network variable have to capture this effect. 
According to Chiswick (1999), self-selection is driven by the rate of return to migration, 
more capable subjects being favorably selected in terms of education. If the cost of migration is 
too high and financial market is underdeveloped, migration is too costly for less qualified potential 
migrants (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). Once migrant networks expand, lowering costs, they can 
allow newcomers with lower financial capabilities. With this structure of costs, we can explain the 
results of McKenzie and Rapoport (2007a, 2007b) in term of self-selection. Networks reducing the 
cost of migration allow newcomers from the left tail of the income distribution. Newcomers, being 
“education expensive”, are more likely to have lower levels of education. The expansion of 
networks, at least in the medium term, causes a decrease in the quality level of migrants in terms 
of observable characteristics. 
The model presented in this paper demonstrates that migration is a cumulative process in 
which each migrant alters the “structure of the world”. In this framework, the dimension of flows 
of migrants, their level of selection in terms of observable characteristics (i.e. negative cohort 
effect in term of education) and the quality levels of those who are left behind (brain drain) are 
characterized by the moment at which migration is observed. 
Through the model, we show that even in cases of extreme positive selection at individual 
and aggregate levels, the negative cohort effect (i.e., lower level of observable qualities of 
successive migration cohorts) and brain drain represent the normal evolution of migration flows 
when there is no economic convergence between sending and receiving countries or 
requalification policies. 
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Although all these effects are independent of networks, once migrant networks are taken 
into account new effects arise. In particular networks can drastically modify what we call the 
natural limit of migration and the timing of migration. 
 
2 Basic Model 
Let us imagine an economy composed of a large number of households        , with  
large, and overlapping generations along the lines of Samuelson (1958), in a framework similar to 
that of Loury (1981).7 Time is a discrete variable and each individual lives 2+1 periods. The growth 
of the population is assumed at the moment to be 0, so that in each period the same numbers of 
people enter and leave the economy.8 
A person living in the first period is called Child, in the second Adult. Each Child is 
“attached” to an Adult, and this is our definition of a “strict” household. At the +1 period (third 
period of life) a subject is called Old and is no longer a member of the household. This is the first 
difference between our model and Loury’s (1981): our economy is composed of two principal 
decision-makers, the household and what we call the “Council of Elders”. The Council of Elders 
brings together all the Old people, and has two main functions: to provide the Old with means of 
survival and to make important decisions about the use of financial social capital.9 That is, the Old 
cannot work or produce and therefore their consumption must be financed through a “social tax” 
and remittances. 
In our economy, the household is the basic socioeconomic unit, and the Adult makes all the 
economic decisions. Household income depends on the income function of the Adult, which is 
based on that person’s level of innate abilities ( ) and education ( ). As in Loury (1981), household 
income must be divided in each period between consumption ( ) and Child schooling (  ). In this 
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 We choose Loury’s (1981) framework looking for a model in which innate abilities and education were taken into 
consideration as separate elements. Secondly, Loury’s framework assumes a “balkanized” market for education - that 
is, households must self-finance their offspring’s education. We believe it is more correct to consider education 
investment in developing countries, excluding the existence of working education loan markets. Even when and where 
free public education is available, sending children to school instead of to work is a form of investment which affects 
the household consumption. Last but not least, the model proposes intergeneration social mobility among households 
according to abilities and education levels. This implies that mobility closely depends on innate abilities and education 
variance, and on their payoff. 
8
 Section 5 discusses what happens when the population grows. 
9
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framework, we assume no child labor10 and no savings,11 so that investment in children’s 
education is the only way of transferring wealth across time. The education level of the household 
head is a function of the investment made in the previous period. Production requires neither 
social interaction between families nor the use of factors of production other than Adult time, 
which is supplied inelastically. Here is the second main difference with respect to Loury (1981): a 
fraction of the family income is paid to the Council of Elders’ budget. Since this fraction is a fixed 
percentage of income,12 it does not affect either the income function form or household behavior. 
Households cannot decide to evade payment because the Council of Elders controls both formal 
and informal economies, and this means that those who evade it will suffer full punishment, which 
will set their productive capacity at 0.13 
Consumption is the second family activity. We do not examine here how consumption is 
shared within the family. The only assumption is that the utility function in terms of consumption 
is steep enough to ensure that consumption cannot fall, by choice, under certain survival levels. 
The level of innate abilities, assigned at the beginning of life but only known when Adult 
age is reached, varies among individuals. Production technology is assumed to be equal for all 
households in each period of time. Calling income  : 
   (   ) ( ) 
is the income function of each Adult, and follows the usual assumptions, so that it is continuous, 
differentiable in its arguments in space   , increasing in its arguments and marginally decreasing. 
Education is a function of investment in education   , and follows the same assumptions. 
We also assume that extreme values of abilities ( ) have such high returns that  [ (   )]  
 [ (   )]. 
The Adult chooses how to divide income between consumption and Child education. The 
utility function is equal for all households and has two main arguments: actual consumption, and 
the discounted wellbeing of the Child when that Child becomes an Adult14. The earnings function 
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 Following Basu & al. (1998). 
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 This is in line with the mainstream of development literature. 
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 It may also be interpreted as a “tax”. 
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 See Mude & al. (2003) page 9. 
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 See Becker and Tomes (1979): there are not many differences in assuming that parents care about their children’s 
income or consumption in the future. 
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of offspring is a random variable determined by the distribution of abilities and the education level 
financed by an Adult of the previous generation. 
 
2.a The Child Decision 
Before analyzing the Adult decision process, let us consider the Child decision when that 
Child becomes an Adult. At the beginning of their Adult life period, subjects have to decide where 
to settle for the rest of their lives. Here is the third main difference with respect to Loury (1981): 
new Adults may remain in the origin community or country or leave it for a wealthier community 
or country. If they stay at home, their income will be: 
   (   )  ( ) 
and their maximization will exactly be like that of their ancestors, so that the model can be 
brought back to Loury (1981). If they decide to migrate, their income will be: 
     (   ) ( ) 
where   is the difference in real terms between the two economies.15 Migration has a cost   , 
which must be paid before it takes place. The cost incorporates both the financing of migration 
(housing, transport, information, etc.) as well as the psychological cost that results from leaving 
home and adapting to the host country: 
            (  ) 
where     is the fixed cost of migration and     is the psychological and adaptation component. It 
may also be expressed as a function of  , to take into account the fact that more able subjects 
should be faster in adapting to the receiving country’s context: 
  ( )   ( )         ( )  (  ) 
This is strictly decreasing in   as noted by Borjas (1999). Since there are no savings in our 
economy, new Adults ask the Council of Elders for the money they need. In exchange, the Council 
of Elders requires remittances ( ). However the Council of Elders cannot finance all the people 
who want to migrate. The rationale underlying who will be financed is discussed below. 
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 Here we implicitly assume that returns for abilities and education are equal across countries. What makes the 
difference is only the level of the economy or, as defined by Mude et al. (2003), the relative host/home infrastructure 
ratio. 
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Remittances must cover at least the initial cost of migration but, as shown by Stark et al. (1989),16 
they usually exceed this value: 
   (   ) (  ) 
where  (  ) is decided by the Council of Elders. New Adults have an incentive to migrate if: 
          ( )  (  ) 
We assume that free-riding is not allowed, i.e., all migrants pay remittances. This 
assumption is not very strict: if a person does not repay the “loan”, the related Old person will be 
isolated and excluded from the Council: unable to work, he will die (maximum punishment). If the 
council decides to finance migration, the location decision of the new Adult is: 
   [ (   )   (   )       ( )]    (   ) 
      
   (   )                                                    (   ) 
If the Council decides not to finance migration, the model comes back to Loury (1981). 
Before proceeding to examine the Adult decision-making process, it is useful to analyze new 
Adults’ incentives to migrate in terms of variations of innate abilities. A subject migrates if: 
          ( )                                              (   ) 
(   ) (   )   (   )     ( )                      (   ) 
The first term, (   ) (   ), is strictly increasing in   and  ,  (   ) is independent of  , 
and    ( ) is decreasing in  , so that it enters the incentive with negative sign. Therefore, the 
overall equation is strictly increasing in  . The incentive to migrate decreases if costs of migration 
increase. The probability that a new Adult has an incentive to migrate is: 
 [(   ) (   )   (   )     ( )   ]
   ∫   ( )  ∫   ( )
  (  
 (   )    ( )
(   )
)
 
 
 
               (  ) 
where   ( ) and   ( ) are the distribution of innate abilities and education respectively. 
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 Our economy may also be seen as an enlarged family decision. 
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2.b The Adult Decision 
Coming back to period 1, Adult, caring altruistically about family consumption and Child 
wellbeing, maximizes household utility: 
   
     
     (   )    (  ) 
where   is the probability the Council finances migration, and   is the indirect utility function, to 
take into account the wellbeing of the Child when the Child becomes an Adult. Following Loury 
(1981: 846) an indirect utility function is “consistent if it correctly characterizes the relationship 
between maximized expected utility and earnings for a parent whenever it is taken to characterize 
that same relationship for the offspring”. In our case,    is the consistent indirect utility function if 
it solves: 
  (  )     
      
[∫      (  ) (   
 ( (    (    ))))
 ̅( (    ))
 
 ∫      (  ) (    
 (  (    (    )   (   )     (  )))
 
 ̅( (    ))
]    (  ) 
S.t.:  ̅( (    )) is the level of ability, given a certain level of education, necessary for a 
Child to be chosen for migration by the Council, and it is identically estimated by Adult and Child, 
and so on for each generation. Implicitly, this means that Adult and Child will act in the same way 
when facing the same situation. In addition, Adults are not able to forecast correctly the 
distribution of ability and education for a period longer than a generation. 1 and 2 stands for the 
generation to which the number is related. After migration takes place, for second-generation 
migrants, the model comes back directly to Loury (1981). 
Assumption 1: (i)     
     is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously 
differentiable function on the interior of its domain, satisfying (   )   . (ii)     , 
   
   
  
  
(   )       (  ) 
(iii) There exists     such that  (   )    
  , (
  
  
)  [     ] 
Assumption 2: (i)     
     is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave in e, 
satisfying  (   )   , and  (   )   ,      . 
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(ii)  
  
  
(   )            (   )    
     (  ) 
(iii) There exists    ,  ̂    such that:  
   ̂ ⇒    
     
  
  
(   )         (  ) 
Assumption 3: Innate economic ability is distributed on the unit interval independently and 
identically for all agents. Distribution has a continuous, strictly positive density function, 
  ( ) [   ]     
Theorem 117:Under Assumption 1 to 3, there exists a unique, consistent, indirect, utility function 
  on [   ]. 
Demonstration: Appendix A 
 
2.c The Council of Elders. 
The Council of Elders is responsible for managing the community social capital through two 
main functions: ensuring taxes and remittance payments, and deciding whom to finance for 
migration. It is a structural artifact we propose to overcome the decision making process since our 
aim is to focus on the dynamic and not on the way each household or each community produce 
them. However the council could be made of one person (household head) if the migration 
decision is made at household level, as well as by a group of household heads (often observed in 
migration from rural villages in Africa) or even at country level as if migration was organized in a 
planned economy. 
The Council can finance only a fraction of those eligible. This fraction is function of the 
amount of remittances the Council received in the previous period. Assuming that all the wealth 
controlled by the Council must be redistributed in the economy, the budget constraint of the 
council is: 
      ∑  (  (   ))
     
   
             (  ) 
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where      are the number of migrants in the previous period,   are remittances
18 , 
∑  (  (   ))
   
    is the social contribution (“social tax”),   is the total consumption of the Old, 
      is the amount needed to finance the migration of  new Adults, and   is the residual part 
reinvested in local economy. 
To simplify, we assume that the Council has an incentive to send those who have higher 
levels of expected returns in the receiving country. This is in line with Chiswick’s (1979) selection 
theory, and is explained by the fact that people with higher levels of innate abilities and education 
have a lower probability of failure in migration. In addition, in our economy, sending people with 
higher incentives implies the possibility of receiving higher remittances. This is the strongest 
behavioral assumption in our model. 
Behavioral Assumption 1: the Council of Elders finances the migration of individuals who are 
comparatively better in terms of the compound value of (   ). That is, we assume highly positive 
selection of migrants in terms of a compound value of ability and education. 
 
3 Dynamics Analysis 
We start our analysis by considering the dimension of migration flows, and then move our 
focus to the quality of migrants. The strategy the Council adopts has important implications on the 
economic growth and convergence path among countries. Nevertheless, to determine a long-term 
strategy is probably beyond the Council’s reach, so it will probably adopt some “rule of thumbs” or 
a trial-and-error process. In this context, the concept of long-term optimal strategy is unsuitable, 
because the optimal strategy is probably determined in the short or medium term. To be able to 
assess the dynamics of the model analytically, we need to assume that the Council adopts an 
“investment and development” strategy which that does not change in time. 
Behavioral Assumption 2: the investment strategy does not change in time. The strategy is 
required to be constant, not optimal. 
We start with a simple situation which helps to identify most of the forces involved in the 
dynamics. We assume that the budget of the Council of Elders is employed in constant proportions 
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 Here we implicitly assume that the value of the remittance does not vary across periods. 
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between Old people’s consumption and sending New Adults abroad. This implies that nothing is 
reinvested in the local economy: 
      ∑  (  (     ))
     
   
    (   )       (  ) 
where   is the share of the Council income used for consumption. Recalling that R is a function of 
   , the number of migrants at period   is given by: 
   
     (   )
(   )   
 
∑  (  (     ))
    
      
(   )   
(  ) 
The number of migrants at time   depends on the total amount of remittances in the 
previous period, and decreases as the cost of migration increases. Since the cost of migration is 
decreasing in the number of compatriots in the receiving country (Massey & al., 1994), larger     
not only increases the total amount of remittances (keeping   constant) but also reduces    , 
generating a self-perpetuating process (everything else remaining the same). At the beginning, the 
number of migrants which can be sent is relatively small, but increases over time through the 
possibility of financing more migrants each round. 
It is important to note that, even when networks play no role in the migration decision, 
they do not influence costs or preferences, the self-perpetuating process can start. As already 
mentioned it is enough to keep constant the economic distance between countries ( ) and the 
proportion between Old consumption and investment in migration ( ). Each round, as      , 
the Council has a return from investing in migration. With this simple framework, a growing 
investment in migration will be possible each round, up to the point at which everyone who has an 
incentive migrates.19 
Two other effects must be taken into account. First, the decision on how to allocate 
remittances: they can only be used for consumption, and this does not generate the self-
increasing process mentioned above; otherwise they can be used to speed up migration, keeping 
consumption constant and sending abroad as many co-villagers as possible. Second, without 
population growth, ∑  (  (   ))
   
    decreases constantly because of relative depopulation and 
brain drain. Differentiating with respect to time and simplifying: 
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 We will come back to this issue later, when describing the qualitative effect of migration. 
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(         ) 
    
 
∑  (  (     ))  ∑  (  (     ))
         
   
            
   
    
 
  
    
    (  ) 
Holding consumption and remittances constant, the growth in the migration rate is 
increasing in the number of compatriots abroad (if      is decreasing in the stock of compatriots), 
while component ∑  (  (   ))  ∑  (  (   ))
         
   
            
    enters the equation with a 
negative sign. While depopulation is not observed at aggregate level,20 the decreasing quality of 
potential migrants must be taken into consideration. In the long term and in the absence of shocks 
reduced social contribution may have a negative influence on the council’s budget. To avoid this 
risk, remittances must not be only higher than the cost of migration, but they must compensate 
for the loss of social contributions: 
      (     )         (  ) 
This condition ensures that financing migration is always profitable. This assumption is 
plausible and does not substantially modify the result of the model, except for the fact that it 
avoids complex relations between migration and council strategy. 
Since depopulation is not an observed phenomenon in sending countries, it is necessary to 
define a rule of substitution of the leaving population. Independently of demographic dynamics, 
we assume that all migrants are replaced by applying one of the following rules: perfect 
replacement, random replacement with fixed distribution, random replacement with modified 
distribution. 
Perfect replacement: whenever a New Adult ( ) migrates, that person is replaced in the 
origin country by another Adult ( ), equally able (     ) and skilled (     ). 
Random replacement with fixed distribution (RRFD): whenever a New Adult migrates at 
time  , that person is replaced in the origin country by another Adult randomly drawn from the 
original distribution of ability and education. 
Random replacement with modified distribution (RRMD): whenever a New Adult migrates 
at time  , that person is replaced in the origin country by another Adult randomly drawn from the 
distribution of ability and education at time  . 
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 Section 5 discusses what happens in the case of population growth. 
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We begin our analysis with the simple case of perfect replacement. 
Proposition 1: Under the hypotheses that: 
 migrants are perfectly replaced; 
 there is growth in outmigration between subsequent periods (       ); 
 the economic distance between countries is not reduced (       ); 
 costs and remittances are constant. 
There is a negative cohort effect. 
With perfect replacement,   (   )      (   ),   (   ) being the distribution of (   ) at 
time  . The number of migrants at time   is: 
    ∫   (   )
{ (   )  ̅}
 {(   ) (   )  (   )    ( )  }(   )      (  ) 
where  is the total population,  {(   ) (   )  (   )    ( )  } the characteristic function which is 1 
if a subject has the incentive to migrate and 0 otherwise.   (   ) is the distribution of (   ), and 
is the maximum value of  (   ), such that all the population with  (   )    ̅is not financed to 
migrate. 
The above equation determines implicitly that  ̅   (̅  ) is a strictly decreasing function 
of  . This follows from the positivity of   (   ), implying that the integrand in the above 
expression is positive; therefore the difference          is positive if and only if condition 
 (̅  )   (   )   (̅    ) is verified for some values of (   ) - that is, if  (̅  )   (̅    ). 
As  (   ) is an increasing function of (   ), this implies that the flow of migrants at time 
    is increased with respect to the flow at time  , but the difference between the two flows is 
composed of people with lower values of (   ) compared with their migrant ancestors. That is, 
there is negative cohort effect. 
To obtain analytical results about the effects of migration, we develop our analysis in the 
continuum. This is a good approximation for large populations and over long periods of time. This 
approximation is also a correct approach if subjects migrate at random times in a time continuum, 
which seems to be the case for migration. Obviously, continuum analysis does not allow us to 
evaluate the time-scale of migration. As a further technical simplification, migration and 
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substitution occur at the same time. This is implicit in the continuum approximation and affects 
the general results only marginally. 
Proposition 2: Under the hypotheses that: 
 migrants are randomly replaced with fixed distribution or randomly replaced with modified 
distribution; 
 economic distance between countries, costs and remittances are constant; 
 the distribution of  (   ) does not change during generational changes. 
Both a negative cohort effect and brain drain occur. In addition, the quality of present migration is 
a function of past migration. 
To prove proposition 2 and analyse its qualitative implications, some graphic 
representations are useful. Picture 1 shows a generic distribution of compound (   ). 
 
First, let us define   ̅as the minimum level of compound  (   ) at time   for which there is 
an incentive to migrate.   ̅is what we define to be the natural limit of migration: that is, the limit 
of the compound distribution at which there is no incentive to migrate at individual or community 
level: 
 ̅     (  ̅            ̅        )   (̅   (   )    )    (  ) 
Define  ( ) as the number of people with  (   )   . The total population at the initial time is: 
  ∫  (  )
 
 
      (  ) 
𝜑 𝑓  𝑓(𝛼 𝑒) 
𝑛(𝑓) 
𝑓 ̅
Picture 1 generic distribution of compound (α,e). 
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 ( ) is the population with a level of ability  (   )   , and  ( ) is the population with 
 (   )   : 
 ( )  ∫  (  )                 ( )     ( )    (  )
 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. Define  ( ) to be the number of subjects in the population with 
 (   )   . In the case of RRFD, we can write the continuous differential equation for  ( ) as: 
 (    )   ( )   ( )    ( )
 ( )
 
     (  ) 
where ( ) is the number of migrants at time   and ( )
 ( )
 
   the replacement term, when 
subjects are drawn from the original distribution of qualities. Thus: 
 
  ( )
  
   ( ) (  
 ( )
 
)                          (   ) 
 ( )   ( )  ∫  (  )   (  
 ( )
 
)
 
 
      (   ) 
We can calculate the time at which condition  ( )    is attained as: 
 (  )   ⇔
 ( )
  
 ( )
 
  (  )       (  ) 
where ( )  ∫  (  )   
 
 
. At time    the population with  (   )    or higher has disappeared. 
Similarly, in the case of RRMD, we can write the continuous differential equation for  ( ) as: 
 (    )   ( )   ( )    ( )
 ( )
 
     (  ) 
where ( ) is the number of migrants at time   and ( )
 ( )
 
   the replacement term, when 
subjects are drawn from the compound distribution of qualities at the time migrants leave. Thus: 
  ( )
  
   ( ) (  
 ( )
 
)                                  (   ) 
∫
  
  
 
 
 ( )
 ( )
  ∫  (  )   
 
 
                               (   ) 
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    (
  
 ( )
 
  
 ( )
 
)    ( )                                  (   ) 
 (  )   ⇔    (  
 ( )
 
)   (  )             (   ) 
Now we can replace  ( ) with initial cumulative function ( ( )), where  ( ) is the 
maximum value of quality at time  : 
 ( )     
  (   )
 (   )    (  ) 
The RRFD and RRMD migration equations are respectively: 
 ( ( ))
  
 ( ( ))
 
 ∫  (  )   
 
 
  ( )               (  
 ( ( ))
 
)   ( )    (  ) 
where ( ) is the total number of migrants from 0 to  . This means that migration is a cumulative 
phenomenon. The result validates the use of the migration propensity as proposed in Massey et al. 
(1994), and constitutes a theoretical basis for cumulative causation theory. As the above authors 
argue, characteristics of migration flows do not describe “the migration flow per se, but rather, a 
phase in its development”. If we rewrite the two equation in terms of  ( ( )), we can compute 
migrants’ quality level: 
 ( ( ))  
 ( )
  
 ( )
 
                        ( ( ))   (    
 ( )
 )  (     ) 
That is, the quality of today’s migrants is a function of the “community history of 
migration”. We assume for example that a fixed number of migrants is sent abroad each round, 
that is, in each round the population with    ( ) migrates. ( ) is a function of the incentives 
and strategies adopted by the Council. Under both replacement rules, in each round we observe a 
deterioration in the population quality level in terms of Education. Therefore, we observe brain 
drain and a negative cohort effect. In fact, ( ) decreases over time or, better, as ( ) grows 
(graphically,   moves left each period).  ( ( ))  may be interpreted as the distribution of 
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qualities which is “no longer present”21 with respect to the original distribution. ( ( ))    
 ( ( )) is the upper part of the original distribution22 and  ( ( )) decreases as ( ) decreases. 
Let us suppose that the council finances the same number of migrants each year. To keep 
this number constant each round, the Council must move the minimum level of required abilities 
to the left. This reduces the quality of those not involved in migration and, given the structure of 
our economy, the quality of their offspring. The quality of offspring, i.e., their education, is a 
function of the parents’ current investment in education, that is, a function of their income. As 
income increases in innate abilities (which are independent among generations) and in education 
(which is correlated among generations), and as those who leave are on average better educated, 
they are the richer ones. Those who remain have lower incomes, and thus less possibility of 
investing in the education of offspring, and so on. 
With each “step” in the migration we observe a brain-drain in the sending country and a 
negative cohort effect in the receiving: as the quality of those who remain decreases, so does the 
quality of migrants. In particular, what decreases is their average education that is usually the only 
observable characteristics. 
These two consequences of migration flows can be observed without exception when 
applying RRFD and RRMD, or a mixed replacement rule. The main difference between the two 
forms of replacement is the speed of convergence to the natural limit of migration. In both cases, 
there exist a limit to the process just described. The limit is fixed at the level at which: 
 ( ( ))   ( )̅    (  ) 
In both cases,     ( )
 
  
 ( ( ))   ( )̅, where   ̅is a function of: the level of physical 
and psychological costs, the expected returns, and the remittance level. Although a different rule 
of replacement implies a different speed in reaching this limit (slower under RRFD and faster 
under RRMD), we identify three main scenarios (see Pictures 2, 3 and 4) under the vinculum of 
constant migration flows.23 
                                                          
21
 All people belonging to that part of the distribution migrate. 
22
 The shaded area in Picture 1. 
23
 Increasing migration flows will only speed up the process, thus further emphasizing our results. What happens 
under decreasing migration flows needs deeper investigation. 
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Picture 2 shows the normal case. The quality of migrants sent each period decreases as  
grows. When level ̅  is reached24 no further decrease in migrants’ quality is observed: we may say 
that migration ceases. This does not mean that no migration can be observed, but that, by chance, 
once someone appears in the sending country’s economy with an ability level higher than  ,̅ that 
person is “instantaneously” financed to migrate. In the long term we may say that migration 
ceases, because almost nobody has the incentive to migrate. 
Picture 3 shows a scenario in which the economic distance between the two countries is so 
large and/or costs are so low that migration never stops. That is,  is always higher than  .̅ For 
example, the receiving country may be psychologically attractive (the psychological cost of 
migration is zero or less) and, for some reason, migration costs are especially low (common 
language, border sharing). In this situation,  decreases step by step until each member of the 
sending country has migrated.25 
                                                          
24
 In principle, this value may be identified if we knows details of the original population: original distribution of (   ), 
and the cost of migration. Value ̅  also identifies a unique period   of time (in the absence of shocks). 
25
 This is the case of countries migrants are obliged to cross to reach their preferred destination. In some of these 
countries migrants may stay longer than just the time to cross them, for example, because they need to accumulate 
capital to finance the remaining migration. These countries observe a continuum of migrants leaving to reach their 
preferred destination psychologically attractive and entering (replacing those who leave). We do not observe 
depopulation because the transitory flow continues in the long term. 
𝜑 
𝑓(𝑡) 
𝑓 ̅
?̅? 𝑀 
Picture 2: Natural limit of migration 
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Picture 3 shows the extreme case, in which   ̅is negative. This is not necessarily the only 
representation for migration without natural limit. It may simply be that the lowest level of   is 
always larger than  .̅ This is possible if there exists a minimum of the distribution of (   )that is 
larger than  .̅ 
Picture 4 displays the case in which initial costs make migration non-profitable, and, so no 
migration is observed. 
 
 
These findings are robust even when a mix replacement rule is applied. Let us assume that 
both the total population and outmigration are constant, and define    and    as the percentage of 
migrants who are substituted by applying RRFD and RRMD, respectively, (       ) is the 
percentage of migrants replaced with identical subjects. 
Proposition 3: independently of the replacement rule adopted, in the condition of: 
𝜑 
𝑓(𝑡) 
𝑓 ̅
𝑀 
𝜑 
𝑓(𝑡) 
𝑓 ̅
𝑀 
Picture 3: Migration “without Natural Limit” 
Picture 4: No Migration 
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 no full perfect substitution (i.e.          ); 
 constant population; 
 no changes in the fundamentals of both economies; 
brain drain and a negative cohort effect are the results of migration flows. 
Defining ( ) as the total number of migrants: 
 ( )  
 ( )
  
  
[
 
 
 
   (
 ( ( ))
 ( )
  )    
  (
 ( ( ))
 ( )
  )    (
 ( ( ))
 ( )
  )
]
 
 
 
 
   (  ) 
The equation is a weighted form of the migration equation in the case of RRMD, and 
therefore has the same dynamics concerning migration flows and the quality of migrants. 
Before moving to the analysis of migrant networks and their effect on migration paths, let 
us summarize the main results of this section. We show that, in a simple overlapping generation 
economy, in which only ability and education determine the wellbeing of households, several 
phenomena can be observed when introducing migration. 
We prove that migration over time modifies the structure of the economy. Each migrant is 
affected and affects other people’s migration choices. This self-perpetuating phenomenon has a 
limit in terms of numbers of migrants and their ability levels: the natural limit of migration. 
We also prove that, in some specific conditions, particularly in positive self-selection, a 
negative cohort effect and brain drain are the normal consequences of migration. This result has 
great importance for two main reasons. First of all, it explains the contrasting results obtained by 
scholars when analyzing the level of selection of migrants, reconciling positive selectivity with a 
negative cohort without introducing new variables. In particular, the negative cohort effect is not 
the effect of decreasing selectivity and does not requires a reduction in costs (allowing newcomers 
from lower levels of the education/income distribution), but is the result of the increased 
possibility that sending communities have of financing migration, and of the brain drain which 
decreases the quality of potential migrants. 
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4 Effect of Migrant Networks 
 
Migrant networks are usually identified as the main cause of the negative cohort effect. In 
our framework it is not necessary to reduce migration costs in order to observe the negative 
cohort effect. Therefore, the role of networks must be examined to understand their influence on 
the dynamics of the model. 
Reduction in costs and risks due to networks may be implemented in our model through 
the incentive mechanism at individual and community levels. The individual incentive is: 
(   ) (   )       ( )                        (   ) 
   (   ) (   )   (   )     ( )        (   ) 
where  ( )  is the remittance mark-up function determined by the Council of Elders. The 
community level incentive is: 
      (     )          (  ) 
That is, the return of the investment in migration must be larger than the cost and loss of 
social contributions. We also know that incentives enter the model through the natural limit of 
migration. We define the natural limit of migration as the value of compound (   ) at which 
migration is no longer attractive. Recalling that: 
 ̅     (  ̅            ̅        )   (̅   (   )    )   (  ) 
If networks are able to modify costs and risks and thus the expected return of migration, 
we can rewrite the migration incentive equations: 
( ( )   ) (   )   (   ( ))     (   )    
                (     )     ( )   (     ) 
Hence for  ̅   ( ( )  (   ( ))    ( )). Thus      ⇒ (̅ )  . 
We identify some peculiar scenarios (see Picture 5 – 9). We must define         ̅  before 
describing each scenario. 
    is the minimum value of  such that          ⇒  ( )   (̅ ) 
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 ̅ is the maximum value of  such that            ̅  ⇒  ( )   (̅ ) 
 
 
 
 
Pictures 5 and 6 respectively show the evolution of the scenarios of Pictures 2 and 3. In 
Picture 5, the scenario satisfies the following condition: 
 ( )   (̅ )          (  )   (̅  )   (  ) 
This is the typical effect of networks hypothesized in the literature. At the beginning 
(       close to 0), costs of migration are high, so only those with higher levels of abilities and 
education have an incentive to migrate.26 Once migration starts, the presence of compatriots 
reduces the cost and risk of less skilled compatriots. Networks speed up migration and reduce the 
natural level of migration ( )̅, increasing the total amount of potential migrants. The new endpoint 
                                                          
26
 Moreover, the more skilled are usually people belonging to wealthier social groups who can afford higher migration 
costs. 
𝜑 
𝑓(𝑡) 
𝑓 ̅
?̅? 𝑀 
𝜑 
𝑓(𝑡) 
𝑓 ̅
𝑀 
Picture 5: Natural level of migration decreasing as M grows. 
Picture 6: Strong Network Effect 
23 
 
has a higher value of ̅  and a lower level of qualification of migrants with respect to a situation in 
which networks have no effect on costs and risks. 
As Picture 6 shows the brain drain effect may be slower than the speed at which networks 
reduce costs and risks (i.e.,  ( )   (̅ )      ). This means that migration will never cease 
(at the limit, we see everyone migrating, even those who have a compound of ability and 
education close to 0). 
Picture 7 shows the opposite scenario. While at the beginning, as a rule, networks reduce 
the costs and risks of migration, increasing migration flows (or, rather, the number of subjects who 
have an incentive to migrate), they produce the opposite effect when a certain critical mass is 
reached. This may happen, for example, when networks become “ghettos”. 
There are economic explanations for the U-shaped form shown in Picture 7. As we have 
seen,  (̅ ) is determined by migration costs and economic distance between countries. If both 
psychological and physical costs decrease as the network grows, the relationship between   and  
is a priori unclear. On one hand   should increase in . Networks increase the probability of 
getting a job in the receiving country, increasing the expected return of migration. Nonetheless, 
the informative advantage has an upper bound as  grows. On the other hand, being migrants 
usually concentrated in some regions and economic sectors, large migration flows produce an 
excess of labor supply, increasing unemployment and thus reducing the economic distance 
between countries.27 
 
 
                                                          
27
 We may also observe salary growth in sending countries, because of the relative scarcity of workers. 
𝜑 
𝑓(𝑡) 
𝑓 ̅
𝑀 ?̅? 
Picture 7: U-Shaped network effect 
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Pictures 8 and 9 shows two scenarios in which migration cannot start spontaneously. The 
costs of migration are too high, and so nobody has an incentive to migrate. If something breaks 
the equilibrium28 and threshold   is reached, the self-perpetuating process described previously 
can start. In Picture 9,   ̅and  cross twice, and there is nothing which excludes the possibility that 
there are many more different crossing-points. 
One scenario that may generate multiple crossing-points is when migrants move from one 
economic sector or region to another. Such intra-sector movements happen whenever the 
saturation point of one sector is reached. If migrants concentrate in a particular economic sector 
(in Europe, it may be the construction industry, in the US the agricultural sector) the result is an 
excess of supply. Because the network and its members are specialized in that particular work 
sector,29 it will take time to get successful results in other economic areas. Once the door of a new 
sector is opened, the network comes back to its self-increasing function. 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 We have several historical examples of this scenario: the colonization of Australia with convicts, deportation 
because of civil war, the creation of a state like Israel, and family reunification after the Second World War and the 
Vietnam war. 
29
 They have specific skills, contacts and information on available job positions in the sector, and even monopolistic 
positions in the job market of the sector. 
𝑀  
𝜑 
𝑓(𝑡) 
𝑓 ̅
𝑀 
Picture 8: Threshold 
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 All scenarios identified above may be synthesized in a single theorem. 
Assumption A:  (̅ ) is a continuous function of the network size . The effect of the network on 
 (̅ ) (i.e.  (̅ )   (̅ )) is always negative or zero for   .30 Define  
      {    
   ( )   (̅ )}    (  ) 
and 
      {    
   ( )   (̅ )               
         (  )   (̅  )}    (  ) 
   represents the lower threshold for migration and   the upper limit of migration. Both   and 
   can be in either   
  or  . 
Lemma 1: if a value  exists such that ( )   (̅ ), then     , otherwise      and 
    . 
Proof: if     
 , then (  )   (̅  ), and it therefore belongs to the set: 
      {    
   ( )   (̅ )               
         (  )   (̅  )}   (  ) 
Therefore, the supremum of this set is greater than or equal to  , i.e.,     . 
Theorem 2: in the absence of a network,   may be either 0 or  , and there exist only three 
possible scenarios: 
                                                          
30
 This assumption is explained by noting that for M=0 the network is absent and cannot affect  .̅ In addition, if the 
effect of the network on   ̅becomes positive for M>0, then it is always possible to migrate outside the network or to 
other areas. Thus, the actual effect of the network is null. This assumption implicitly does not account for racism and 
ghetto phenomena which affect migrants independently of their position with respect to the network. 
𝜑 
𝑓(𝑡) 
𝑓 ̅
𝑀 𝑀  
?̅? 
Picture 9: Threshold and ghetto 
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 (a1)             : no migration; 
 (b1)            
  : limited migration; 
 (b2)              : unlimited migration. 
When a network is present, then   
(       )    
(          )  and   
(       )    
(          ) 
(that is, the existence of a network always increases the possibility of migrating) and five possible 
scenarios exist: 
 (a1’)            : no migration (corresponding to (a1) in the absence of a 
network); 
 (a2’)       
 : a pathological case, with migration above multiple (infinite) 
thresholds (corresponding to (a1) in the absence of a network); 
 (a3’)    
         
           : limited migration above the threshold 
(corresponding to (a1) in the absence of a network); 
 (a4’)     
           : unlimited migration above the threshold 
(corresponding to (a1) in the absence of a network); 
 (b1’)            
  : limited migration (corresponding to (b1) in the absence 
of a network); 
 (b2’)              : unlimited migration (corresponding to (b1) or (b2) in 
the absence of a network). 
Proof: without a network,  ( )    ̅is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of , so that 
the set {    
   ( )   (̅ )} corresponds either to the interval [    ) or to the empty set, 
so that            . 
From the assumption on the effect of networks:  (̅ )   (̅ ) therefore the set {    
   ( )  
 (̅ )} is a subset of {    
   ( )   (̅ )}. From the properties of the infima we obtain: 
  
(       )    
(          )    (  ) 
Similarly,  
(       )    
(          ) can be verified by studying the two cases   
(          )    
and  
(          )     separately. If  
(          )     then  
(          )      
(       ), 
because it is the supremum of an empty set. If  
(          )   , the set {    
   ( )   (̅ )} 
is a subset of {    
   ( )   (̅ )}, and set {    
                   (  )   (̅ )} is 
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a subset of {    
                    (  )   (̅  )} . Therefore, we can obtain 
  
(       )    
(          ) from the properties of the suprema of the joint set. From these 
results and the constraints on     and     classification of the scenarios proposed in the 
theorem is straightforward. 
 
5 Population Growth 
 
In this section we examine what happens when we introduce population growth. To 
implement population growth, we assume that migrants keep the rates of population growth at 
home and in the receiving country constant.31 To simplify the analysis, we derive the model under 
the FFMD substitution method. 
We rewrite the equations, such that ( ( )) is the number of Adults with value of 
compound (   )  larger than  ( )  in the initial distribution.  ( )  is the upper limit of the 
compound distribution in   and is the minimum level of the compound to be financed at time  . 
Define 
 ( ( ))
 ( )
 as the percentage of the initial population with compound value larger than  ( ): 
 ( ( ))
 ( )
  ̂( ( ))    (  ) 
Because we assume that the fertility rate in sending and receiving countries does not vary, 
we define ( ) as the number of migrants and all their offspring in the receiving country. That is: 
 ( )  ∫  ( )
 ( )
 ( )
 
 
      (  ) 
where ( ) is the number of migrants at  . If we assume that   ̅, as in the previous Section, is a 
function of the total network of migrants (including offspring), thus: 
 ̅   ( ( ))    (  ) 
 
                                                          
31
 This assumption is plausible for first-generation migrants, but becomes problematic when we consider second- and 
third-generation migrants, who usually standardize to the rate of reproduction of the receiving country. 
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This implies that: 
 ( )
 ( )
  ( ̂( ( )))    (  ) 
where  ( )      (   ) is an increasing function in      . To investigate the dynamics, we 
need to fix the population at a certain positive value. We can write: 
 ( )   ̂  (   (
 ( )
 ( )
))    (  ) 
Where ( ) is decreases in ( ) and increases in ( ). Picture 10 shows this scenario. The main 
difference with respect to the previous scenario is that, here, ( ) is a family of curves which vary 
as ( ) varies. The family of curves is also constituted by the same curve rescaled on the 
horizontal axis with a scale factor proportional to . 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
The theoretical analysis presented here, giving a formal representation to Cumulative 
Causation approach, brings together several lines of thought on the relation between migration, 
education and networks. We started from an overlapping generation model along the lines of 
Loury (1981) introducing a second market for workers. Once economic agents are allowed to 
migrate, properties identified by Loury are preserved. 
This allowed us to study the dynamics of migration flows with a strong focus on the quality 
of migrants. Starting from the assumption that a single subject cannot, alone, finance migration 
(which seems to be the case for the largest groups of migrants), we introduced a “planner”, which 
𝜑 
𝑓(𝑡) 
𝑓 ̅
?̅? 𝑀 
Picture 10: Population Growth 
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decides how many people and who can be financed. The planner, called the Council of Elders in 
the model (somehow inspired to the structure of Senegalese fraternal orders - Riccio: 2004), does 
not need to be structured at village (or higher) level, but may simply be a group of household 
heads taking decisions in an enlarged family network. 
We agree with Chiswick (1978) that migrants are favorably selected, and show that 
decreasing quality among subsequent cohorts is not incompatible with this assumption. Once 
migration starts, independently of the method of substitution used (which is not-quality 
improving), two main forces reduce the observable quality of migrants: (1) when migration flows 
increase in dimension, from time to time there will be enough resources to finance less and less 
skilled people until the natural level of migration is reached; (2) given the intergenerational 
transmission of education and the independence of innate abilities, there will be a draining effect. 
What is observed in the receiving country (where data are usually collected) is a decreasing 
level in the observable quality, and thus a negative cohort effect in terms of education. This effect 
can not only occur in the case of extremely positive self-selection, but it is its consequence when 
there are no investments to compensate for brain drain. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that Cumulative Causation theory has 
been formalized and investigated in terms of quality of migrants, without the need to introduce 
networks. The cumulative process takes place even when networks are not present. 
However, since migrant networks are crucial in migration we modeled the effect of 
networks in our simplified economy. As we showed, even when networks are not at the origin of 
the self-perpetuating mechanism, they can strongly influence the convergence path, speed of 
convergence, and endpoint values. In addition, by reducing the costs and risks of migration, 
networks can increase the negative cohort effect and also produce opposite results. In fact, 
congestion and excess of labor supply may reduce the incentive to migrate. 
Our model is a simplified possible formalization to the Cumulative Causation theory of 
migration in which each migrant is influenced by those who migrated previously and in turn 
influences those who migrate later. Migration time (expressed as numbers of migrants) and the 
quality of migrants are two sides of the same coin and, once one of the two is known, we can 
predict the other. The framework allows us to predict the path a migration flow will take in the 
future and when its natural end will occur, in terms not only of numbers but also of qualities. 
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In our model, the developmental strategy adopted by the Council of Elders plays a cardinal 
role in determining migration flows. To develop our analysis, we make only one assumption: a 
single strategy exists and even if it is not optimal, it is kept constant in time. Nonetheless, the 
ability to reinvest in the local economy instead of in consumption, to invest in education, and/or 
to adopt long term development strategies (if computable) all mitigate the negative effects of 
migration, and may also produce the reverse scenario. Promoting local economic growth, 
investing in children’s education, and developing the right mix between investing in migration and 
in future generations, all produce a “virtuous” mechanism which, in principle, will reduce the gap 
between countries, therefore reducing migration flows and increasing the skill levels of new 
cohorts of migrants. 
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Appendix A 
Following Loury (1981) we must show that mapping    [   ̅]   [   ̅] is a contraction mapping 
thus has a unique fixed point. The map is defined by: 
(  )     
     
   ̃ (   ( (     ))) ( ) 
where ̃  {
 (   ( (    (    ))))                                                   ̅
 (    
 (  (    (    )   (   )     (  )))          ̅          
 
for   [   ̅] define ‖ ‖       [   ]  ( ) . Under this norm   is a contraction on  [   ̅], 
thus, let     [   ̅]: 
‖     ‖     
 ̅    
|   
     
   ̃ (   ( (     )))     
     
   ̃ (   ( (     )))| 
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Let  ̇( ) give the maximum for    ̃ (   ) and  ̈( ) give the maximum for    ̃ (   ), and 
defining  ̃  ( )  ∫      (  ) ( )
 ̅
 
, then: 
‖     ‖     
 ̅    
|  ( ̃ ( ̇  )   ̃ ( ̈  ))| 
    
 ̅    
   {|  ( ̃ ( ̇  )   ̃ ( ̇  ))|  |  ( ̃ ( ̈  )   ̃ ( ̈  ))|} 
    
 ̅    
   {| ̃ ( ( ̇  )   ( ̇  ))| | ̃ ( ( ̈  )   ( ̈  ))|} 
    {    
 ̅    
| ̃ (  ( ̇  )  [   ])|    
 ̅    
| ̃ (  ( ̈  )  [   ])|} 
     {    
 ̅    
| ( (     ̇( )))   ( (     ̇( )))|   
   
 ̅    
| ( (     ̈( )))   ( (     ̈( )))|}    [   ] 
     
 ̅    
  ( )   ( )   ‖   ‖ 
for some      , using assumption 3. Thus  is a contraction and according to the Banach Fixed 
Point Theorem, there exist an unique fixed point     [   ̅] that is the solution to (a). 
 
 
 
 
 
